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NEW SOLUTIONS TO

AN OLD PROBLEM
New York State's Expanding Options for Controlling
Oil and Gas Development in Allegany State Park
by Charles Alexander
The"Neu) Ydrk' Stt&"Officeiof Parks,"Recreation, and Historic' Preservation
(hereinafterthe."Office of Parks 'ciafrrently consideringa plan which would change,-

much of

w.York' Allegany Ste
2

rk from a protected wilderness area-to a man:

agedforest: While this plar the Allegany State ParkRecreation ForestResourceManagement Plan(hereinafter-the Plan"),'fsjustifiedin part by itsutilizationof the Park'svast
timber resources,it has been obj)6ted to by numerousenvirohmental organizationson
the'gioundsthat it would hinjustifiablydestroy a much rarerNew York State resource
-. lands which.remain in their naturalstate. These environmental groups have moved
on vzious fronts to-bl6ckc the Plan's'implementation;one of the most successful of
which. has been their effort to force the Office of Paristo write as broad and corn:

prehensivean Environmental Impact Statement' (El$).as-is possible.
'One of the issues which has arisen concerningthe Plan'sEIS h'as b~e the degiee
to which New York must examine the environmental questions surroundingthe Plan's'
effect d6Hr6ifiandgas development in Allegany. Since the State purchasedonly the surfa'e rights-tomuch of the land making.up Allegany State Parkduring the Park'screa-:
"tion in the 1920's,thsubsurfacerights(i.e., thderight to extract resourcesfrom below
!'the and's'urflace)haie alwdis beeh'held privateli/.Furtherni6re,because most-of this
pJkrddlid4
had its pl~ri ifulo-il andds rieserves tapped priortd 1920,, od
:slnce
tI "ildess,condition-of
the piarkland'proideserylittle access to'mucli of
5
the p 'k;,it comes aslittlesurprisethat most ofthesesubsbrface rights hae fnever-been,
exerid" If the Plai i is
implemehted,howevei;]
bth-thee.'evironmentalfsts'andthe'Office of Parks realize that the-resultingnew roadwaysfalonig with the developing irm-.
-prorementsinoil ahcjgas'eco.ery 'technique., ill mak. acertainamount of previoiusjyunfasibleoil and gas development economicallypractcal,What these two skies dif-fer over'is the degree to .hich"New York State can c6ntrol this development and the
such controlshould bespelled out in the Pas.
.f
extent w h
,EIS.

e

Ini s -'L_.nal
Btok,_ rid' d6i~h, p@eie

dpdicipat'tbeOfficYkfP6rk &6's".1

ingprocess for'the Plane-hs.Office'of Parks address'ed the issue of New'York State's
dg '
i
by lookin4at Ne ~Yrk's existing laws and
rather limited.;Short of spending hundreds of;
ol
nthit buy
molef,
ra!estates:outilght'theLegal:Bckground docurnenns
ment seemed to suggest thatlittle or nothingcould be done to minimize the environmentalimpact Which oil and gas development would have thioughout the Park.The following
paper wazs preparedandpresented to the Office ofParksin order to challenge this assertion thatjNew York's options: were in fact so.limited and to display the various legal
:devices which'otherstates-have used t6 tackle sim'afi environmental challenges. It is
presented here with relativelyfew changesfrom the draft which is currently being consider d by.the Office of Parks.
Charles Alexander is a J.D. candidate, May 1985, State University of New York at Buffalo.
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Resource development, a stated goal of the Allegany
State Park Recreation Forest Resource Management Plan,
is an important aspect of the State's responsibility to
manage State lands properly. Furthermore, because our nation depends so heavily on fossil fuel for its energy needs,
the development of oil and gas deposits under Allegany
State Park must be considered an attractive bonus to what
is primarily a logging proposal. However, as the State Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation noted
in its "Legal Background" document concerning this plan,
resource development is not an issue that can be treated
in a vacuum.

There is, of course, another side to this problem and it goes directly to the responsibility
of the office to limit, to the largest extent practicable, any use of the lands within the Allegany
State Park that are inconsistent with its
ecological and/or recreational value to the
general public. It is the responsibility of Parks
to make certain that it does all that is possible
to protect the values associated with surface
resources, especially in those areas that are
determined to be of critical environmental
importance.'
Since over half of the Park's mineral or subterranean
rights are privately owned, 2 the State must examine what
actions it can take to minimize the impact of these mineral
rights on the Park's environment. It has been clear for years
that some state regulation of mineral rights is necessary.
The Supreme Court of Kansas held as long ago as 1932
that "[t]he ruthlessness with which development of oilproducing land is prosecuted is a matter of common
knowledge, and in such cases some regulation is necessary
to prevent devastation of governmental, social and property
interest."3 Yet, while problems similar to the one in Allegany
State Park have been recognized for years, it is only recently
that states have begun exercising the power necessary to
take firm control of the situation.
Recent changes in the oil and gas laws of many
mineral- producing states provide New York with two ways
of increasing its ability to protect Allegany State Park. The
first of these would alter the balance of control between
surface owners and mineral estate owners in land where
these oftentimes antagonistic estates are owned by two different parties. By increasing the surface owner's so-called
"correlative rights" in this area, New York State would increase the right of surface owners to control the development of minerals under their property. In parks such as
Allegany, where New York State owns only the surface
rights to much of the land, this could have an enormous
effect on the State's ability to protect the environment. The
second method available to the State is the passage of a
lapse statute. Such statutes provide a determination of exSPMNG 1985

actly what mineral rights are privately ovned and, in addition, allow a state to condition the retention of these rights
on some minimal investment in their use.
The two methods listed above are products of the
same legal trend; state oil and gas laws are changing in
ways that increase a state's ability to control mineral
development. Considering the situation in Allegany and,
more generally, the environmental questions that surround
mineral development throughout our state, New York must
be willing to embrace this trend toward increased control
and thereby ensure itself the exercisable power necessary
to protect the environment. Either by administrative or
legislative action, New York must implement those changes
enacted by other mineral-producing states which have increased the state's role in this area. This paper will attempt
to examine both methods by which New York can bring
about such a change.

Increasing the Rights of Surface Owners
Traditionally, the balance of power between surface
and mineral estate. owners, established through so-called
"correlative rights", has been heavily weighted in favor of
the mineral estate. The necessity of fostering mineral
development has long been used to rationalize this inequity and to thereby justify a free rein for mineral estate owners
at the expense of surface owners. This inequity is evidenced by the seemingly neutral fact that owners of mineral
estates have uniformly been allowed "reasonable access"
to surface lands only to the extent necessary for the utilization of their mineral rights. 4 However, in disputes over what
is or is not "reasonable," the mineral estate has traditionally
been considered the "dominant" estate.' This notion of
"dominant" and "subservient" estates has always been a
high hurdle for surface owners to bound in disputes over
the use of their land. In several states this doctrine has
recently shown signs of crumbling. This, in turn, has forced courts to re- evaluate what constitutes a "reasonable"
use of surface lands and, accordingly, adjust the balance
of correlative rights in favor of the surface owners.
As early as 1971, one commentator noted:

it has been held in virtually all petroleum producing jurisdictions that the oil and gas lessee
has the implied right to use so much of the surface as i 'reasonably necessary' to carry out
the purposes of the oil and gas lease... But
this rule itself is not without limitation. Many
courts have recently weakened-this principle by
stating that even though the mineral lessee has
the dominant estate and may use so much of
the surface as is reasonably necessary to carry
out his operations, he must exercise his rights
with due regardto the corresponding rights of
the surface owner. 6 (emphasis added).
23

The applicable test is
no longer what is
reasonable for the
mineral owner to do to
exploit his mineral
estate, but 'what is
reasonable under the
circumstances for both
the mineral owner and
the surface owner to
insist upon.
This concept of a "due regard" that mineral estate holders
must pay to the rights of surface holders has been the point
upon which the balance between surface and mineral rights
has recently begun to shift. In Getty Oil Co. v. Jones,7
which one commentator deemed "the most important decision [in the last decade] dealing with the rights of an oil
and gas lessee to use the surface,"8 the doctrine of
"reasonable alternatives" was first established. Under this
theory, the Texas Supreme Court held that the defendant,
Getty Oil Co., had to remove its oil well pumps from the
plaintiffs land and replace them with an alternative type
of pump that would not interfere with the plaintiffs sprinkler
system. By installing this alternative type of pump, the
defendant would enable the plairitiff to continue maximizing his use of the surface lands. In its finding, the court
stated:
[t]here may be only one manner of use of the
surface whereby the minerals can be produced. [In such a case, the] lessee has the right t6
pursue this use... [However], where there is
an existing use by the surface owner which
would otherwise be precluded or impaired, and
where under the established practices in the industry there are alternatives available to the
lessee whereby the minerals can be recovered,
the f'ules of reasonable usage of the surface may
require the adoption of an alternative by the
lessee. 9
This interpretation of "reasonable usage of the surface,"
which took into account the needs and desires of the surface owner, was a departure frqm the term's traditional
definition under which a mineral holder's usage was held
reasonable or unreasonable without regard to the problems
it caused the surface owner. Obviously, from the surface

owner's perspective, the "reasonable alternatives" doctrine
was a great step forward.
The rationale of Getty has been followed and expanded upon in an ever-increasing number of jurisdictions. The
Utah Supreme Court, in Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 10
allowed damages to a surface owner based on the refusal
of the mineral developer to build a road to a well site that
would have minimized the developer's interference with the
plaintiffs irrigation system. The court held that since the
defendant ignored the plaintiffs reasonable and practical
alternative for constructing its well road, the defendant was
liable in damages for an unreasonable use of the land. This
"reasonable altemative" concept was also embraced by the
North Dakota Supreme Court in Hunt Oil v. Kerbaugh."
In describing its acceptance of this doctrine, the court
stated:

We agree a pure balancing test is not involved
under the accommodation doctrine where no
reasonable alternatives are available. Where
alternatives do exist, however, the concepts of
due regard and reasonable necessity do require
a weighing of the different alternatives against
the inconveniences to the surface owner.
Therefore, once alternatives are shown to exist, a balancing of the mineral and surface
12
owner's interests does occur.

Adopting the "reasonable alternative" doctrine could
obviously be very helpful to New York State in its efforts
to minimize the impact of oil and gas exploration on
Allegany State Park's environment. Such an action would
send a clear message to the Park's mineral estate holders
that although a certain method of mineral development may
be the least expensive, it will be unacceptable under the
State's definition of "reasonable access" if an environmentally preferable alternative is available. Embracing this doctrine would allow New York State to join a growing number
of states in which, according to one commentator, the
applicable test is no longer "what is reasonable for the
mineral owner to do to exploit his mineral estate, but what
is reasonable under the circumstances for both
the mineral
3
owner and surface owner to insist upon."
In addition to the increasing acceptance of the
"reasonable alternative" doctrine, numerous recent state
court decisions have placed other types of limitations on
what constitutes a reasonable use of surface land. Perhaps
the most interesting of these decisions was handed down
by the Michigan Supreme Court in Michigan Oil Company
v. NaturalResources Commission. 4 This decision upheld
the Michigan Natural Resource Commission's protection
of a designated wilderness area despite this action's interference with the exercise of private mineral rights. ConIN TfE PUmC l1TEsrsT

.

.

struing Michigan's Oil Conservation Act of 1939,5 the
Court approved the administrative denial of a drilling permit and in doing so

manner of its exercise are reasonably necessary
to effectuate the development of the mineral
20
estate.

gave great weight to the semi-wilderness
nature of the land in question, emphasizing the
fact that the Pigeon River Forest provides one
of the few remaining habitats in the lower peninsula for elk, bear, bobcat, beaver, eagle, and
other wildlife. Because of the special value of
the land in question for non-oil and gas activities, and because oil and gas development
would destroy the wilderness character of such
land, the Court held that the Natural Resources
Commission had authority to deny a drilling
16
permit in the Pigeon River Forest.

By shifting the burden of correcting surface damage to the
mineral developer, these statutes force developers to "intemalize", or factor in, the environmental costs of their
undertakings. The North Dakota Supreme Court, commenting on the traditional allocation of surface damage costs,
noted that "the social desirability of a rule which potentially allows the damage or destruction of a surface estate equal
exor greater in value than the value of the mineral being
21
tracted [is, at the very least, very questionable.]"
The North Dakota court went on to state that

...

A variety of other courts have based findings of
"unreasonable use" of surface lands on the non-use of constructed mineral development facilities. Roads that had
been constructed to service potential drilling areas and were
subsequently never used constituted an unnecessary and
unreasonable use of surface lands in Texaco u. Joffion"7
Similarly, the court in Lanahan v. Meyers 8 held that inground storage pits which went unused for several years
following their construction were an unreasonable use of
the land's surface. The Lanahan decision was particularly
important in that it was the fiist case in which time was
held to be a proper ground for a suit based on unreasonable
usage. All these decisions are similar in that they all
evidence the recent trend of state courts to broaden the
definition of "unreasonable use" in controversies concerning the use of surface lands.
While the state court decisions listed above have had
a great impact on the correlative rights held by surface and
mineral estate holders, recent legislative acts in this area
have proved equally important. As a whole, these acts tend
to increase the burden upon mineral developers to restore
surface lands to their pre-development condition. these
acts, which increase the traditional rights accorded to surface owners, have provided New York with a model for
legislative action that could be used to solve environmental problems such as Allegany.
Most of the State statutes passed in this area impose
strict liability on users of mineral estates for all damages
done to the surface. Such statutes display the increasing
degree to which states are rejecting the traditional rule in
this area which, as interpreted by New York State's "Legal
Background" document,' 9 held
that the owner or lessee of the mineral estate
is entitled to use of the surface of the premises
without liability for surface damage caused by
his operations, so long as such use and the
SPING 1985

[fluture mineral exploration and development
can be expected to expand as our demand for
energy sources grow. Equity requires a closer
examination of whether or not the cost of surface damage and destruction arising from
mineral development should be borne by the
owner of a severed surface estate or by the
developer and consumer of the minerals.22

Since 1980, at least three states have made this "examination" and determined that mineral developers should
bear the cost of surface damages. The statutes in these
three states, North Dakota,2 3 Montana,2'4 and Oldahoma,25
are similar in that they all impose strict liability for surface
damages regardless of whether or not the developer has
been negligent or in any way "at fault."26 By passing this
type of "strict liability" mining law, New York would join
the growing number of states who are forcing mineral estate
owners to factor the environmental costs of mineral
development into their business decisions. This, in turn,
would allow mineral development to take place only in
those areas where development is more truly economically efficient. It is important to note that the traditional rule
allowing mineral developers to escape the costs of their environmental damage was developed during a period when
the importance of environmental protection was not yet
recognized. The trend toward imposing liability, however,
is based on the realization that mineral development,
although as important as ever, is only one important land
use and, as such, must be balanced against the potential
damage it imposes. Under a strict liability scheme, New
York would be assured that funds would be made available
for restoring surface lands that suffer developmental
damage. In areas such as Allegany State Park, this alteration of the economics of mineral development would greatly
increase the likelihood of maintaining the land's present
condition.

I

Many states have passed acts that, although different
from "strict liability" statutes, accomplish a similar increase
in the rights and protections afforded surface owners. Kansas passed an act in 1957 that requires mineral developers
to return land "as near as practicable" to its pre-developed
condition, which thereby produces a result nearly identical
to that of the "strict liability" statutes.2" Wyoming's Surface Owner Consent Statute,2 8 on the other hand, works
very differently to increase the rights of surface owners.
Under this law, applicants for mining permits, which are
necessary for all mining operations within the state, must
include the written consent of the surface owner in their
application. Although the statute includes procedures for
mediation between surface and mineral owners when a surface usage agreement cannot be reached, the statute, as
one commentator noted,
has the practical effect of reversing the legal
position(s) of the surface owner and the mineral
estate owner. Before the statute was passed the
mineral estate had always been held to be the
dominant estate while the surface estate was
considered the [sub]servient estate. Now the
surface owner... is in the dominant bargain-

.ing position. According to this statute, no mining can be done in such lands without the surface owner's consent; therefore, mining permit
applicants have no choice but to meet the
demands of the surface owner.2 9
An alternative method for producing the intemalization of environmental costs can be found in the penal "antipollution" statutes of Kansas3" and Oklahoma. 31 Under
these statutes, mineral developers who allow pollutants to
escape from the development process are subject to
criminal penalties. Furthermore, these developers are held
strictly liable in all civil actions based on damages resulting
from violations of the penal statutes. The criminalization
of these offenses shows how seriously many mineral producing states have come to regard the problem of mineral
development's environmental costs. However, while the
results of these laws will, in many cases, be the same as
those under the standard "strict liability" statutes, the penal
statutes are subject to enforcement problems that inevitably
haunt attempts to solve environmental problems through
criminalization (e.g., the high burden of proof placed on
the prosecution). It is not surprising, therefore, that the
"strict liability" and "owner consent" statutes are currently
the statutes most popular with state legislators trying to
bring about environmental cost "internalization" in mineral
production.
The case and statutory law involved with the "correlative rights" of surface and mineral estate owners shows
an unmistakable trend toward increasing the rights of surface owners. As was noted in a 1982 ai ticle, "[tihe recent

legislative initiatives in North Dakota, Montana, and
Oklahoma suggest a growing political power and assertiveness by surface owners. [Furthermore,] Getty v. Jones
and its progeny suggest an increased willingness by courts
to balance the competing and sometimes conflicting interests of the surface and mineral estates."32 As the en-

vironmental costs of mineral development are increasingly recognized, this trend should remain strong and help to
produce a mineral development industry that factors in all
of its "real" costs. This, in turn, will lead to mineral development decisions based on a more accurate assessment of
such production's overall cost to our society. Both these
statutory and caselaw developments concerning "correlative
rights" provide important tools for controlling mineral
development which New York State can use to protect
Allegany State Park. That these trends should prove useful

The exercise of private
rights on public lands
is an intrusion into the
public's use of such
land. If such intrusions
are possible, then
managers of public
lands must carefully
prepare for them; to
be caught without a
plan of action will
surely place a hardship
upon the land.
for protecting the environment comes as little surprise. As
one author commented, "[t]here can be no doubt that the
pressures of the environmental movement have been instrumental in causing the courts [and presumably state
legislators] to give more and more weight to [the] rights
of ... [surface owners] in disputes which have arisen in
33
this area."

Since the State has a great many options for adjusting
the "correlative rights" of surface and mineral estate holders
and thereby increasing its control of private production of
oil and gas in Allegany, it should carefully assess the various
legislative and judicial decisions rendered in other states
and select the measures best suited to protecting its surIN THE PUBUC ITEREST

face interests in the Park. By carefully examining the ac-tions taken by other mineral-producing states, New York
can dramatically increase its ability to protect the Park's
environment. As Dr. Peter Buttner, Director of Environmental Management for the New York State Office of Parks,
Recreation and Historic Preservation, stated in his paper
detailing New York State's management strategy for oil and
gas development on public lands,
[t]he exercise of private rights on public lands
is an intrusion into the publics use of such land.
If such intrusions are possible, then managers
of public lands must carefully prepare for them;
to be caught without a plan of action34will surely place a hardship upon the land.

Lapse Statutes
The second legal method New York State can employ
in its effort to protect Allegany State Park's environment
is the passage of a lapse statute, either separately or in conjunction with other acts designed to increase its rights as
a surface owner. Lapse statutes, or dormant mineral
statutes as they are often called, have recently gained
popularity as a legislative tool for controlling and monitoring mineral estates. These statutes address the rather complex problem of determining exactly what mineral estate
rights are held in a given area and by whom they are owned. As Dr. Peter Buttner noted in his paper on New York
State's oil and gas development strategy for public lands,
"f[e]xcepted oil and gas rights are almost always a problem
to unravel and authenticate."35 This problem is particularly difficult in areas such as Allegany, where much of the
land was divided into surface and-mineral estates more than
half a century ago. 36 By determining exactly what areas
of the Park are subject to privately held mineral estates,
a lapse statute would allow the State to more accurately
assess the problems that subsurface rights are likely to
cause for any long-range plans designed to protect the Park.
Furthermore, after such a statute is passed, crefully
targeted acquisitions in park areas that prove to be
predominantly clear of private claims may become an important alternative for preserving the wilderness areas of
Allegany.
Lapse statutes can be broken down into two general
categories:
(1) Recordation statutes, which impose [only]
registration requirements on [all mineral estate
holders of land whose surface rights are held
separately], with the failure to record resulting
in merger with the surface estate or forfeiture
to the states; and (2) conventional dormant
mineral statutes, which impose specific requirements such as registration, taxation, or actual production, that, if not satisfied in a set
5sP
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time period, will cause the mineral estate to be
considered abandoned and will vest the mineral
surface estate out
estate in the owners of the
3
of which it was carved. 7
While a "recording" statute may sufficiently answer questions concerning the ownership of mineral rights in
Allegany, a "conventional" statute might be additionally
helpful in that it would force the owners of economically
unfeasible mineral estates to relinquish their unburdened
hold on parkland. In explaining the rationale behind Indiana's passage of a "conventional" lapse statute, the Indiana Supreme Court stated that "[the Act reflects the
legislative belief that the existence of a mineral interest
about which there has been no display of activity or interest
by the owners thereof for a period of twenty years or more
is mischievous and contrary to the economic interests and
welfare of the public."38 Note, of course, that such a "con-

ventional" statute may force mineral estate owners of
Allegany parkland to develop their interests where, absent
such a statute, they would be content to let them lie. This,
in turn, may have a negative impact on Allegany's environment.Such considerations must be carefully weighed in
order to ensure that New York passes a lapse statute that
best serves its needs.
Regardless of which type of lapse statute New York
enacts, it can expect to face roughly the same series of legal
challenges. One such challenge will arise if New York
decides to apply its statute retroactively. This type of application would be especially helpful in situations, such as
Allegany, where mineral rights that have been dormant for
decades may now start causing immediate problems. It
should be noted that although most lapse statutes allow
for a 20- to 25-year period of inactivity before a mineral
estate can be deemed lapsed, not all of these statutes allow
for retroactive application. All those that do, however, in-

After a lapse statute is
passed, carefully
targeted acquisitions in
park areas that prove
to be predominantly
clear of private claims
may become an important alternative for
preserving the
wilderness areas of
Allegany.

clude a grace period following the statutes enactment during which a mineral estate owner can register his mineral
rights and thereby avail himself of the full lapse allowance
time. Indiana's retroactively applicable "conventional" lapse
statute, which was recently upheld by the United States
Supreme Court in Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 9 includes a twoyear grace period during which mineral estate holders can
record their interests. Addressing the question of whether
this grace period allowed mineral estate holders enough
notice as to the law and whether the retroactive application of the statute was constitutional, the Supreme Court
in Texaco held that "[ilt is settled that the question whether
a statutory grace period provides an adequate opportunity
for citizens to become familiar with a new law is a matter
on which the Court shows the greatest deference to the
judgment of state legislatures."4"
One argument frequently made by lapse statute
challengers is based on the conflict between the traditional
legal doctrine of "abandonment" and the way in which lapse
statutes work. Since a claim of common law abandonment
has always required a demonstration of the owner's intent
to relinquish his property, the simple neglect of a mineral
estate holder's property rights has traditionally not supported such a claim. As a result, the use of the term "abandonment" in numerous lapse statutes has led to challenges
claiming that such statutes impliedly require some show
of "intent to relinquish." This problem, however, can be
simply taken care of by avoiding the term's use. One author,
commenting on the Indiana lapse statute's use of the term
"extinguished" rather than "abandoned," stated that

[b]ecause of the possible complications in the
use of "abandonment," legislatures would be
prudent to draft dormant mineral statutes using other terms to avoid confusion with traditional legal principles of abandonment. Then
these principles concerning abandonment...
would not be 'stumbling blocks' in declaring a
statute legally and constitutionally valid. 41

Other legal challenges that lapse statutes have faced
are more complex than the problems with this use of traditional terminology. However, most if not all of these
challenges have been discussed and subsequently dismissed by the Supreme Court in Texaco. One such argument
claims that lapse statutes violate the federal Constitution
by impairing the obligation of contracts. Noting the grace
period available to mineral estate holders, the Court stated
that "a mineral owner may safeguard any contracted obligations or rights by filing a statement of claim in the county
recorder's office. Such a minimal 'burden' on contractual
obligations is not beyond the scope of permissible state
action." 2 Another argument is based on.the contention that
the operation of lapse statutes allows uncompensated "tak-

ings" of private property. To this the Court replied, "[i]t is

the owner's failure to make use of the property - and not
the action of the State - that causes the lapse of the property right; [hence,] there is no 'taking' that requires compensation."

3

While the arguments listed above, along with those
based on such doctrines as "vagueness" and "equal protection", have been made by many of the various lapse
statutes' challengers, perhaps no argument has been made
as often or as vehemently as the contention that lapse
statutes deny mineral estate owners their right to procedural
due process. This claim stems primarily from the Supreme
Court's definition of due process issued in Mullane v. Central HanoverBank and Trust Co. 44 In-Mullane, the Court

held that "at a minimum [the words of the due process
clause] require that deprivation of life, liberty or property
by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case."45 In Texaco, the Court divided this problem into two distinct issues,
the right to "notice" and the "opportunity to be heard." The
Court dismissed the "notice" claim by declaring that "[i]t
is well established that persons owning property within a
state are charged with knowledge of relevant statutory provisions affecting the control or disposition of such property."46 The Court then went on to dismiss the "opportunity

to be heard" issue with a more general pronouncement
stressing the difference between adjudicative and nonadjudicative proceedings.

The reasoning in Mullane is applicable to a
judicial proceeding brought to determine
whether a lapse of a mineral estate did or did
not occur, but not to the self-executing feature
of the Mineral Lapse Act. The due process
standards of Mullane apply [only] to an 'adjudication'that is 'to be accorded finality.' (emphasis added)
A careful reading of Texaco makes it clear that the
Supreme Court, in rejecting the myriad of challenges leveled at Indiana's lapse statute, felt that such statutes are
legitimate instruments by which states may control property rights. According to the Court, "just as a state may
create a property interest that is entitled to constitutional
protection, the state has the power to condition the permanent retention of that property right on the performance
of reasonable conditions that indicate a present intention
to retain the interest."48 Hence, whether New York State
believes a "recording" or "conventional" lapse statute would
best serve its needs, it is apparent that such an act would
pass constitutional muster. Because of the advantages that
a lapse statute could provide for the State in confronting
its mineral estate problem in Allegany State Park, this option unquestionably deserves very careful attention.
IN THEPUBUC INTEPST

Conclusion
New York State faces a complex problem in Allegany
State Park; it must allow private mineral estate owners to
make a fair use of their property rights while, at the same
time, protecting the Park's environment from irrevokable
abuse. Solving such a problem necessitates an ability on
the part of the State to control the private mineral development that takes place within the Park's boundaries and,
in addition, the assurance that mineral development decisions will take environmental costs into account.Fortunately, the State has a number of legal options by which it can
ensure these conditions. The increasing acceptance by
numerous State courts and legislatures of the two methods
examined in this paper, the enlargement of surface owners'
"correlative rights" and the passage of lapse statutes, is a
trend that New York State should carefully examine and
make full use of. By doing so, New York will greatly increase its ability to prevent long-term environmental
damage to Allegany at a relatively small cost.
Although these legal options are presented as a means
by which the negative environmental impact of the Allegany
State Park Recreation Forest Resource Management Plan
could be minimized, their importance might be even greater
if this plan were rejected and an effort was made to maintain the Park as a protected wildemess area. In deciding
this more immediate question, whether or not the plan for
Allegany should be implemented, New York State should
not take too lightly the warning President Nixon gave our
country in 1973.
An important measure of our true commitment
to environmental quality is our dedication to
protecting the wilderness and its inhabitants.
We must recognize their ecological significance
and preserve them as sources of inspiration and
49
education.
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